Abstract

Table of Contents

Part I

Part II

Part III

Part IV

Part V


     

Part V: A Christian World View: The Framework of History

     WHAT WE have been trying to show is that the historical process reflects the interaction between three families of people descended respectively from the three sons of Noah to whom God appears to have apportioned specific responsibilities and equally specific capabilities for the fulfillment of them: to Shem, responsibility for man's religious and spiritual well-being; to Japheth, his mental well-being; and to Ham, his physical well-being. By this apportionment it is not implied that every Semite has tended to be more religiously minded, and every Japhethite more interested in intellectual exercise, and every Hamite more mechanically inclined or more practical than members of the other two families. All that is intended is that the great religions of the world -- true and false (46) -- had their roots in the family of Shem, all true philosophical systems have originated within the family of Japheth, (47) and the world's basic technology is a Hamitic contribution. We have then noted that when these three worked together in balanced harmony, civilization as a whole has advanced because maximurn restraints have been placed upon the evil consequences of sin while the purposes of God are being carried forward.

46. The paganism of the Old World, rooted in Babylonian religious beliefs (see A. Hislop, The Two Babylons, Loizeau Brothers, New York, 1953): Mohammedanism; and Judaism, with its outgrowth Christianity. Hinduism is not a religion in the sense that these are, but a religiously coloured philosophy.
47. I think it is noteworthy that the gods of the Hamitic peoples have tended to be gods of power; the god of the Aryans, a god of intellectual enlightenment; and the God of Israel, a God of the salvation of the soul.

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      It is important to observe that all three are necessary for this. If any one element is given over-emphasis the ultimate effect is detrimental. No society prospers which is overly materialistic, or overly intellectual, or overly spiritual. Man is neither an animal nor an angel. He cannot dedicate himself to mere physical survival and the exploitation of his animal appetites. Nor can he dedicate himself to nurturing his soul to the neglect of his body. And by the same token, of course,he cannot retire to an ivory tower either, for then he must starve in body and soul.
     One of the effects of the Fall is to rob man of a proper balance. He becornes a creature of extremes, of improper enthusiasms, of unbalanced dedications, and correspondingly of a tendency to fatal neglect. Many neglect their spiritual life in our materialistically oriented culture. Many neglect the nceds of the body in the mystically oriented cultures of lndia. Many neglect the exercise of their minds, as primitive peoples have often been accused of doing. (48) Any such neglect violates human nature and severely hinders the normal development of the whole man. Both excess and neglect are equally unhappy in their consequences and serve rathcr to heighten than to restrain the disastrous effects of the Fall. Neither the spiritual contribution of Shem, nor the intellectual conltribution of Japhteth, nor the technological contribution of Ham really benefit man as they were intended to do without the balancing constraint of the other two.
      We have also noted that only when the contribution of Japheth is effectively brought to bear upon the contribution of Shem does theology emerge; and theology does not emerge without it. Moreover, when this
same intellectual contribution of Japheth is applied to the technology of Ham, then science emerges, and science does not emerge without it. This does not really mean that the contribution of Japheth is more irnportant than the other two, for it might just as easily have been stated in reverse. The philosophizing of Japheth leads nowhere without the pabulum of technology supplied by Ham, and this pabulum far antedates any scientifc philosophizing of Japheth, as we shall

48. I do not mean by this that primitive people are potentially any less intelligent: only that they seem to rest content with a thorough knowledge of the total wisdomof their culture without challenging, exploring, or seeking to understand the rationale of it. 'I'hey neglect mental activity for its own sake. The important difference between intelligence and accumulated knowledge is explored in an interesting way in "Establishing a Paleolithic IQ" (see Part III in Genesis and Early Man, vol.2 of The Doorrway Papers Series) which deals with early man as well as modern primitives.

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show. By the same token, human intellect does not do well in its reach after spiritual truth apart from revelation: indeed, it leads rather into darkness and general skepticism. Between Malachi and Matthew God remained silent, while at the same time the outworkings of Greek philosophy were permitted to run their course in the search for ultimate reality and spiritual understanding. And how did it end? It ended in almost total skepticism summed up in Pilate's cynical and yet perhaps honest question, "What is truth?" I suggest that this is why Paul, after visiting Athens and seeing there their altar to "an Unknown God" (Acts 17:23), suddenly realized with new force how hopeless it was even for the best intellects in the world and under ideal conditions to arrive at a true understanding of the nature of God and man's relationship to Him. This, I suggest, is why he wrote later to the Corinthians and said, "After that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God," then God sent forth His Son (1 Corinthians 1:21). Thus did God permit Japheth to discover for himself the inadequacy of the contribution he could make apart from the revelation of God which came through Shem.
      However, it is in harmony with this view of history that after the revelation of Himself had been established through the Old Testament -- the nature of true religion, of true worship, of what God required of man and of what man might hope for in God -- and after God had completed (really, "fulfilled") the Old Testament revelation in the Person of Jesus Christ His Son and seen to it that the details of His rnessage and lifework were sufficiently preserved in a record, the Gospels -- then God turned to the Gentiles, the Japhethites, to take this body of religious truth and set it forth as a Christian theology. God used Hebrew for the Old Testament and probably a form of Semitic speech, namely, Aramaic, as the basis of the Gospel record. (49) But then He turned to a Japhetic language in order to convert this revelation into a structured organic systematized faith, in short, into a theology.
     It will be worth examining to what extent scholars have recognized the uniqueness of Semitic forms of speech, and particularly of Hebrew, as a vehicle for the presentation of truth which concerns man's soul, and then to explore Japhetic

49. On this question, sce Edouard Naville, Archaeology of the Old Testament: Was the Old Testamerit Written in Hebrew, Scott, London, 1913, 212 pp., and see especially pp.3-29; and also George Lamsda, The Four Gospels According to the Eastern Version Translated from the Aramaic, Holman, Philadelphia, 1933, Introduction, pp. v-xxii.

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languages as the most perfect vehicle for the organization of this revealed truth into a Christian theology.

      It is perhaps significant that of all peoples who can trace themselves back or who can be traced back to Japheth, the Greeks have been most forward in recognizing him as their great progenitor, under the name Japetos. It is as though God wished us to know in no uncertain terms that it was Shem through whom the initial revelation came to us, and Japheth through whom that revelation was finally set in order. Yet the two languages are fundamentally different. In a study of the contrast between Greek and Hebrew thought, Thorlief Boman has gone to great lengths to show how different are these two modes of speech and consequently how different are the ways of thinking which these two languages allow. One might even say predetermined. (50) In a critical study of Boman's views, Professor James Barr in spite of his hostility towards them, has nicely summarized the position taken by Boman and others, as follows. (51)
     First, the contrast is made between "the static and the dynamic." The Greeks were ultimately interested in contemplation, in withdrawing from "doing," in order to be free to meditate and to reason. The Hebrews were not interested in philosophy per se, but only in action. Their religious zeal was dynamic. Secondly, the contrast is between the "abstract" and the "concrete." Barr states it: (52)

     It is a characteristic procedure of Greek thought to work with abstractions. Abstract terms of the kind we call qualities and properties are essential in this kind of discussion. . . . Hebrew thought, on the other hand, does not work with abstractions; its terms are always related to the actual object or situation and not to an abstraction from it.. . . The contemplative approach, by contrast, means dissociation of the mind from involvement in action. In Hebrew thought the thinking object is the acting person.

     Thirdly, the contrast is in "the conception of man," as Barr puts it: (53) "In Greek thought man is seen as a duality, with an irnmortal soul imprisoned or confined in a mortal body; the two are

50. Boman, Thorlief, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, SCM Press, London, 1960.
51. Barr, James, The Semantics of Biblical Language, Oxford, 1962.
52. Ibid., p.11.
53. Ibid., p.12.

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only temporarily or accidentally related. In Hebrew thought the soul is the living person in his flesh."
      This dualism versus monism has been viewed as analogous to the difference between a rider (the soul) on a horse (the body), and a centaur, a soul-body entity. In the Old Testament, and not unnaturally to some extent in the Gospels, the soul is without hesitation taken as the whole man. Thus by inspiration and looking forward to the Lord's Resurrection David said, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hell": and in saying this he meant as much his spirit as he did his body. In the Epistles, by contrast, rnan is taken apart, the body, the soul, and the spirit, being concretely � or perhaps one should say, discretely � divisible (Hebrews 4:12). Such a prayer as that our whole soul and body and spirit might be preserved blameless is a Greek concept of man rather than a Hebrew one, though God saw fit to set forth both concepts in Scripture. Thus it comes about that in the New Testament the construction of biblical psychology in this matter is quite possible and certainly worth attempting. But the Old Testarnent does not encourage the making of such an attempt, though it provides the basic framework in a different form The two complement each other, and the complementarity resides ultimately in the difference between the two languages, not merely in vocabulary but in mode of expression, way of thinking, in its view of reality.
    The extent to which this difference is dependent primarily upon language and secondarily upon the kind of mentality which emerges as an individual matures while speaking that language is noted by Barr. The point at issue here is very similar to the old question of the hen and the egg: which came first? Only in this case, I think the answer is clearer. It is the language which we learn as children that orders our thought processes as we mature, until we come to equate the two and to presume that we are thinking first and then finding words to express our thought, while all the time the vocabulary and grammar of our language is determining for us how we shall view reality. As B. L. Whorf rightly observed, (54) we see things not as they are but as we are, a fact of fundamental importance which every once in a while becomes startlingly clear when we come to discuss some subject of mutual interest with a person whose language differs from our own.

54. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, "Science and Linguistics," Technology Review, vol.48, 1940.

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      It is perfectly true that we do think first and then put our thoughts into words whenever we are trying to comrnunicate in a language which is not our own. Indeed, it is universally agreed that we do not really master any language until we think in it, without any need for translation, a circumstance which proves the point I am making, i.e., that we think in words.
     It will be worth pausing for a moment at this point before proceeding to examine the implications of this, to consider a few opinions on the matter from those best qualified to speak, namely, the linguists.
     Although the intimate relationship between word and thought has been remarked upon and studied since the time of Humboldt, it is only in recent years that the natter has become a subject of study in its own right and not merely as a side issue in general linguistics. Two names stand out pre-eminently in relation to this, namely, Ernst Cassirer and Benjamin Lee Whorf. As an introcluction to what Whorf called metalinguistics, the following quotations are taken from miscellaneous writings of his, and although they are extracts from a number of separate papers, they can be read consecutively as though they were a continuum. In a paper entitled, "Science and Linguistics," he wrote: (55)

     Talking, or the use of language, is supposed only "to express" what is essentially already formulated (in the mind). Formulation is an independent process, called thought or thinking, and is supposedto be largely indifferent to the nature of particular languages. Languages have grammars which are assumed to be merely norms of conventional and social correctness but the use of language is suppose to be guided not so much by them as by correct, rational, or intelligrent thinking.
     Thought, in this view, does not depend on grammar but on laws of logic or reason which are supposed to be the same for all observers of the universe -- to represent a rationale in the universe that can be "found" independently by all intelligent observers, whetlher they speak Chinese or Choctaw

     Subsequently, he continues: (56)

     When linguists became able to examine critically and scientifically a large number of languages of widely different patterns . . . it was found that the grammar of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas [my emphasis], the programme and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions. . . .

55. Ibid., p.3 of reprint.
56. Ibid., p.5 of reprint.

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     Formulation of ideas is not an independent process . . . but part of a particular grammar, and differs as between different grammars. We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there simply because they stare every observer in the face: on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impression which has to be organized by our minds -- and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. . . .
     This fact is very significant for modern science for it means that no individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality, but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. The person most nearly free in such respects would be a linguist familiar with very many widely different linguistic systems. As yet no linguist ever is in any such position. We are thus introduced to a new principle . . . which holds that all observers are not [my emphasis] led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated.
    This rather startling conclusion is not so apparent if we compare only our modern European languages. . . . Among these tongues there is an unanimity of major pattern whichat first seems to bear out natural logic. But this unanimity exists only because these tongues are all Indo-European dialects cut out of the same basic plan, being historically transmitted from what was long ago one speech community. . . .
     When Semitic, Chinese, Tibetan, or African languages are contrasted with our own, the divergence in analysis of the world becomes more apparent; and when we bring in the native languages of the Americas where speech communities for many millennia have gone their ways independently of each other and of the Old World, the fact that languages dissect nature in many different ways becomes patent. The relativity of all conceptual systems, ours included, and their deperdence upon a language [my emphasis] stands revealed.
     What surprises most is to find that various grand generalizations of the Western World, such as time, velocity, and matter, are not essential to the construction of a consistent picture of the Universe. 0

      In another paper of his entitled "Language and Logic," Whorf wrote: (57)

     We cut up and organize the spread and flow of events as we do largely because, through our mother tongue, we are parties to an agreement to do so, not because nature itself is segmented in exactly that way for all to see. Languages differ not only in how they build their sentences but in how they break down

57. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, "Language and Logic," Technology Review, vol.43, 1941, p.21.

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nature to secure the elements to put in those sentences. . . . For as goes our segmentation of the face of nature, so goes our physics of the Cosmos.

     Then in a further paper entitled "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behaviour to Language," Whorf wrote: (58)

     How does such a network of language, culture, and behaviour come about historically? Which was first, the language patterns or the cultural norms? In the main they have grown up together, constantly influencing each other. But in this partnership the nature of the language is the factor that limits free plasticity and rigidifies channels of development in the rmore autocratic way.

     Thus far, then, we see the direction in which modern thinking about the relationship between language and thought, language and World View, language and how people perceive the world about them has been going. In a volume of the collected works of Whorf we may extract one or two further insights. With respect to the question of whether thought is possible without some kind of verbalization, Whorf wrote, "The linguistic side of silent [his emphasis] thinking, thinking without speaking, is of a nature as yet little appreciated." (59) At this point there is a footnote as follows:

     Some have supposed thinking to be entirely linguistic. Watson, I believe, holds or held this view, and the great merit of Watson in this regard is that he was one of the first to point out and teach the very large and unrecognized linguistic element in silent thinking. His error lies in going the whole hog; also, perhaps, in not realizing or at least not emphasizing that the linguistic aspect of thinking is not a biologically organized process . . . but a cultural organization, i.e., a language [his emphasis].

     Thus Whorf would not argue that all things that go on in the mind involve the use of words, but he does hold categorically that one cannot think conceptually, one cannot build a philosophy or a World View silently and to oneself, except by the use of words.
     As a heading to one of his papers, there is a quotation from Edward Sapir which reads: (60)

     Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor

58. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behaviour to Language" in Language, Culture, and Personality, Menasha, Wisconsin, 1941, p.91.
59. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, Language, Thought and Reality, Selected Writings of B. L. Whorf, The Technology Press of M.I.T., Wiley, New York, 1956, p.66.
60. Ibid., p.134.

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alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality without the use of language and that language is merely an accidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection.
    The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. . . . We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.

     The extent to which a word imposed upon some object can predetermine our whole attitude towards that object is strikingly borne out by a simple experiment conducted by Dr. Samuel Glucksberg of Princeton, who found that by giving a common wrench a nonsense label, in this case calling it a "jod," he could greatly increase the number of novel uses to which a group of students imagined it could be put. In other words, given an ordinary wrench which was just called a "wrench," when the students were invited to imagine themselves isolated somewhere and limited entirely to the use of this one tool and then to list all the things they thought might be done with it, they did fairly well. But when they were handed the same tool and told that it was a "jod" and that they were not to think of it by its old name, they did a great deal better and managed to dream up many more useful applications for it. Glucksberg has also said, "To a certain extent the name determined and limited what the object was and therefore what it could be used for." (61) In the light of this experiment it is a measure of Humboldt's perceptiveness that he could write so long ago: (62)

     Man lives with his objects chiefly � one may say exclusively � as language presents them to him. By the same process whereby he spins language out of his own being, h,e ensnares himself in it; and each language draws a magic circle round the people to which it belongs, a circle from which there is no escape save by stepping out it into another.

     It is not hard to see that since language is passed on to each new generation with comparatively small changes in its grammatical structure, though its vocabulary may change, any society will tend to perpetuate its own way of looking at things. And as

61. Gluckberg, Samuel, "Human Inventiveness," Science News, Mar. 4, 1967, p.216.
62. Humboldt: quoted by Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, Dover Publication, New York, 1946, p.9.

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there are families of language, so there will be families of peoples who tend to see things in the same way. Since Indo-Europeans have for some reason maintained the evident relationships in their particular family of languages -- and the same observation applies within the Semitic languages � it is not surprising that even though they have spread so widely they have continued to share a certain way of looking at things: Indo-Europeans philosophically with an emphasis upon the abstract and the Semites with their emphasis upon behaviour from a more transcendental point of view. But what shall we say of the Hamites? From all over the world, wherever they are found and wherever linguists have examined their speech forms and the philosophy of their grammar (to use Jespersen's term), the witness is the same. Their view of the world is an entirely practical one, rooted in the present, wise in a canny sort of way, specific, particular, uninterested in the abstract, inventive, always creating new words or new terms for things, interested in particulars rather than categories, earthy, and very largely disinterested in unlikely possibilities. While we may think of primitive people as being less truthful than ourselves � and most if not all "primitive" people known to us have belonged within the family of Ham � the fact of the matter is quite the reverse. They find it difficult to think hypothetically, to do what every scientist must do, i.e., to tell lies deliberately. If asked a hypothetical question they will not answer it but reject the question as not applicable. Asked how many apples, for example, we would have between us if he had two and I had two, a native would not say "four" but more probably, "Well, I do not have two apples!"
     Elie Reclus, an ethnologist, writing some years ago and speaking of certain primitive tribes, notably the Khonds, says of them: (63)

     Veracious and sincere, they disdain to escape a peril to gain an advantage at the price of a lie, or even a voluntary
inexactitude. . . .
     It was one of the rare errors of J. Stuart Mill to assert that uncivilized men take pleasure in lying, and seem incapable of speaking the truth. . . . But the great philosopher would have expressed himself otherwise if a sojourn in tle Indies had brought him into contact with Gonds and Khonds, with Malers, Birhors, Donthals, and others, who hold truth sacred, and contract no engagement that they do not fulfill. There is no graver

63. Reclus, Elie, Primitive Folk: Studies in Comparative Ethnology, Walter Scott, London, no date, p.258.

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offence than to suspect their word; it is an insult which they wipe out with blood, and if they cannot slay the offender, they kill themselves.

     In a recent communication, Miss Beatrice Myers, a missionary attending the Summer Institute of Linguistics (U.S.A.) said that on one occasion she asked a Cheyenne Indian how he would say, "This is your house." His reply was: "If you owned the house, I wouldn't have to tell you, so I wouldn't say it!" (64) Similarly, the Hopi will speak of ten men because one can actually have ten men: but they would not speak of ten days because one cannot have ten days. Such a concept as a negative number is quite absurd, unless it is seen as a practical indebtedness in economic, or some other such terms. We shall have occasion shortly to docnment these observations extensively. In the meantime it may be observed that while the family of Indo-European languages is readily identifiable as a family, and the Semitic as a family, this does not apply at all to the third group of languages, the Harnitic. The fact is that Hamites have been so inventive that they invent terms with equal facility, and their languages are in such a constant state of flux that within a few generations even tribes living just across a river from each other will find themselves scarcely able to converse any longer. (65) It is the same strange proliferating tendency which prevented the Egyptians, Hittites, Sumerians, Chinese, and Central American Indians from developing an alphabetical script, even though the numbers of signs they were creating multiplied almost astronomically.
     It appears to me that this very fact may have been part of God's providential economy in order to guarantee the quick dispersal of the family of Ham all over the world, to open it up for their brethren who were to follow. A community of language

64. In a letter to her supporters in America and Canada, 1968.
65. Rapid change of native languages: there seem to be several contributing factors at work here. One, which is cultural, is the practice of giving new names to things which for one reason or another have become "dangerous" to speak about because of some circumstance in their "history," or association with the dead. Another is the tendency to see what is specificaily different rather than similar in a series of situations. Thus while we strike various kinds of "blows" with the hand (a tap, a pat, a push, a press, a stroke, etc.), we would retain the common word ''hand'' in each case. Natives do not. A "tap with the hand" would be one word, "pat with the hand" an entirely different one. There are hundreds of words for some particular animal seen in various lights, but no single word for the animal genus. People also adopt names of items as personal names and these then become taboo when the person dies, and have to be replaced!  

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unites people and binds them together. By contrast, when languages proliferate easily to the point of mutual unintelligibility, the tendency to congregate is undermined and dispersion is assisted. It may thus have been God's way not merely of sharpening their nventive genius, but of ensuring that they would spread at the same time. What divided the Hamites in this way was not a difference in language structure, for the philosophy of their languages remained remarkably similar, so that the ways of thinking of the African native, the Chinese peasant, and the American Indian remained for a very long time comparable; it was the vocabularies which changed. This was not nearly so true with Semites or Indo-Europeans.
     But even today, with mobility so tremendously increased and means of rapid communication so greatly extended, it is still true in a way that was largely unexpected, that people hold on to their native language with great tenacity. As Kroeber put it, "Speech tends to be one of the most persistent populational characters and 'ethnic' boundaries are most often speech boundaries." (66)
     So it is important to note the difference between the grammar of a language and its vocabulary, for the latter changes constantly whereas the former remains. And it is the grammar which really holds the key to the World View. Ernst Cassirer in speaking of the "inward form of language," put it this way: (67)

     The form of observation, which underlies all speech and language development, always expresses a peculiar spiritual character, a special way of conceiving and apprehending. The difference between the several languages, therefore, is not a matter of different sounds and marks [i.e., ideographs], but of different world conceptions. . . . Language never denotes simply objects, things as such, but always conceptions. . . . The nature of concepts depends on the way this active viewing is directed.

     It is not what we see so much as how we see it, and as we have already said, we do not see how things are, but how we are. Cassirer put it this way: "It is not a question of what we see in a certain perspective, but of the perspective itself." (68) To revert once more to Whorf in connection with the difference between the word-content of a sentence and the structure of the sentence itself, i.e., the vocabulary as opposed to the grammar, we find this observation: (69)

66. Kroeber, A. L., Anthropology, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1948, p.221.
67. Cassirer, Ernst, Language and Myth, Dover Publication, New York, 1946, p.30.
68. Ibid., p.11.
69. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, Language, Thought, and Reality, The Technological Press of M.I.T., Wiley, New York, 1956, p.258.

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     The meanings of specific words are less important than we fondly fancy. Sentences, not words, are the essence of speech, just as equations and functions and not bare numbers are the real meat of mathematics.

     By the same token he holds that thinking is not dependent so much upon words per se as upon sentences. He spells this out: (70)

     Actually, thinking is most mysterious, and by far the greatest light upon it that we have is thrown by the study of language. This study shows that the forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematization of his own language -- shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic form. His thinking itself is in a language � in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese.
     And every language is a vast pattern system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationships and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness. This doctrine is new to Western Science, but it stands on unimpeachable evidence.

70. Ibid., p.252.

(Chapter continued . . . .)

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